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Abstract 
The "Polluter Pays Principle" (PPP) -cornerstone of the international as well as the european environmental law- 
presents a complicated and multifaceted nature as instrument of environmental protection. Hence, it constitutes 
the background for several instruments of European environmental policy such as the environmental 
responsibility, the environmental taxes and the "green fees", the control of State aids, the system of "tradable 
permits", the regulation concerning the "Eurovignette". Particularly, with regards to the State aids in the 
environmental area the PPP has a very crucial role in the framework of the policy developed on this issue by the 
European Commission. In general, given that the PPP provides for that the polluting undertakings shall bear the 
costs of their pollution reduction investments, it is clear at first glance that this principle imposes a general 
prohibition of granting State aids for compliance with the environmental regulations in order not to distort the 
competition and the function of the internal market. However, the analysis of the EU Guidelines on State Aids 
for environmental protection, the practice of decisions of the European Commission as well as the judgments of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union reveal a different -broader approach- of the PPP. Through the 
thorough study and interpretation of the abovementioned material, the aim of this paper is, firstly, to confirm via 
jurisprudential examples the multidimensional content of the PPP and, secondly, to explore its dynamic role at 
the crossroads of the EU economic law regulations (State Aids) and the EU framework for environmental 
protection.  
Keywords: polluter pays principle, state aid, environmental protection, European Commission Guidelines 
 
1. Introduction 
Given that the environmental protection is placed at the crossroads of international and national law and at the 
intersection of administrative, civil as well as criminal law it seems inevitable to deal with overlaps and mutual 
intermingling of the different rules and legal areas especially due to the complicated nature of environmental 
problems1. Moreover, the rapidly growing ecological crisis in combination with an increasing quantity of the 
produced environmental rules underlines the urgent need for efficient and common environmental principles 
throughout EU seeking to overcome factual complexity, scientific ambiguities as well as interdisciplinary 
regulations' fluidity concerning the environmental protection.  
This aim is accomplished by the article 191(2) TFEU, which proclaims a cluster of principles, including 
the PPP that constitute the foundation of the EU environmental policy. Although clear definition of them was not 
given, their indeterminate nature has not hampered their binding character and their legal effects, since they are 
increasingly being (i) articulated in secondary EU legislation 2  and (ii) used by the CJEU to interpret the 
normative content of substantive provisions of EU environmental legislation 3 . Besides, their amorphous 
formulation in relation with their flexible content designates them as guiding principles of EU environmental 
law-making. In this vein, the PPP forms the background for several EU secondary legislations and plays a very 
important role within the European Commission’s practice of controlling State aid for environmental objectives.  
Concerning particularly the EU State Aids Law, the core rules in this area have been placed since 1957 Treaty of 
Rome. However, the content of this EU policy has changed over the time and is currently designated to result in 
less, but better targeted aid in order to boost the European economy. The fundamental point of the EU State Aid 
regime consists in prohibiting as incompatible with the internal Market the allocation of an aid by individual EU 
Member States to industrial and commercial undertakings. Nevertheless, this prohibition is not absolute and 
there are a number of areas where State aids are seen as necessary and fair4. Therefore, a complex set of EU 
State aid rules is designated to ensure which aids und under which conditions can be considered compatible with 
                                                          
1J. H. Jans, H. H. B. Vedder, European Environmental Law - After Lisbon, 4th Edition, Europa Law Publishing, 2012, p. 40-
41. 
2Indicatively, Article 9(1) of the Directive 2000/60/EC (polluter pays principle), Article 1 of the Directive 2001/42/EC 
(sustainable development), Recital 30 and Articles 4(2) and 14(1) of the Directive 2008/98/EC (precautionary principle and 
sustainability). 
3E. Fisher, B. Lange, E. Scotford. Environmental Law - Text Cases and Materials, (Oxford, 2013), p. 416. 
4A. Biondi, Some Reflections on the Notion of “State Resources” in European Community State Aid Law, (Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 30, Issue: 5, 2006), p. 1429. 
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the needs of the Internal Market. 
In this framework, the aim of this paper is to highlight the interface between the PPP, which belongs to the 
normative basis of the EU environmental policy and law and with some simplification it is called non-
subsidization principle1 and the EU State aid law based on the practice of decisions of the European Commission 
and the judgements of the ECJ.   
 
2. The PPP as legal instrument of environmental protection 
2.1. The origins of the PPP 
The PPP originates from the economic theory of the "internalization of externalities", which imposes on the 
polluters the social costs borne by public authorities responsible for inspecting, monitoring and controlling 
pollution. By the same token, the PPP encapsulates the setting up of a system of charges by which the polluters 
(the persons who generated the pollution by their products or services) bear the financial burden of the public 
policy to protect the environment2. However, despite its initial economic background, the PPP started gradually 
acquiring legal expressions and finally was recognized as pillar of the EU's environmental law and policy.  
In particular3, it was first mentioned in the recommendation of the OECD of 1972 and reaffirmed in the 
recommendation of 1974. According to these texts, the main role of the PPP consisted in allocating “the costs of 
pollution prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to 
avoid distortions in international trade and investment”. Moreover, the polluter should bear the expense of 
carrying out the measures “decided by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable 
state”. In terms of the EU Law, the PPP is set out in a Communication from the European Commission to the 
Council in 1975 regarding cost allocation and action by public authorities on environmental matters. 
Furthermore, the PPP recurred in all subsequent Environmental Action Programs and in the EC Guidelines 
related to State aids for environmental protection. In the framework of the primary EU legislation the PPP is 
consolidated in article 191(2) of the TFEU, whilst in secondary EU legislation appears in several directives. 
Through the lens of international law the PPP is enshrined in the Principle 16 of the Declaration of Rio in 1992. 
 
2.2. The content of the PPP 
Concerning the functions of the PPP, since its first appearance in 1972, it is today understood in a much broader 
sense, not only covering pollution prevention and control measures but also covering liability4. Also, the field of 
application of PPP has been extended in recent years from pollution control at the source towards control of 
product impacts during their whole life cycle. Moreover, the preventive function of the PPP is based on the 
assumption that the polluters will reduce environmental risks by investing in appropriate risk management 
measures as soon as the costs which they will have to bear are higher than the benefits anticipated from 
continuing pollution. Finally, the PPP has a curative function, which means that the polluter has to bear the 
clean-up costs for damage already occurred5. 
In this framework of EU secondary legislation, a twofold interpretation of the PPP is identified:  the 
efficiency interpretation and the equity interpretation. The efficiency interpretation is essentially economic in 
nature pertaining to an internalization of the environmental costs. The equity interpretation is considered to be an 
extension of the basic form of the principle, which pertains to a fair distribution of costs, between the polluter 
and the victim (or the victimized society)6.  
As to implement the PPP within the EU environmental law, there exists a broad range of instruments 
that can be classified into three main categories: command and control law, economic instruments and voluntary 
approaches, provided by “soft law”. Namely, the Environmental Liability Directive, the green taxes, the 
"tradable permits" system, the regulation concerning "Eurovignette". 
 
2.3. The PPP in the CJEU Case Law 
Despite the graspable slogan formulation of the PPP, its implementation turns out to be baffling since the 
principle itself does not elucidate who is the polluter, and which costs should bear. Given that the PPP does not 
constitute a responsibility principle but a principle of imputation of the environmental costs7, its role is not 
                                                          
1M. Stoczkiewicz, The polluter pays principle and State aid for environmental protection, (JEEPL 6.2, 2009), p.171.  
2N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, (Oxford University Press, 2002), p.31.  
3M. Munir, History and Evolution of the Polluter Pays Principle: How an economic idea became a legal principle?, (Social 
Science Research Network, 2013).  
4R. Schmidt, W. Kahl, K.-F. Gärditz,. Umweltrecht, (C.H. Beck, 9. Auflage, 2014), p. 120-121. 
5N. de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market, (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 59, L. Krämer, EC 
Environmental Law, (6th edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), p. 76. 
6O. Peiffert, La contribution de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne à la definition du principe pollueur payeur, (RTD 
Eur., 2012), p. 2-3 
7C. Larroumet, La responsabilité civile en matière d' environnement. Le projet de Convention du Conseil de l’Europe et le 
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consisted in giving answers to these questions, but in functioning as a general instrument of environmental 
protection that is used both by the policy maker and the administration in order to determine the responsible 
polluter and the amount of the cost of the prevention or remediation of the environmental damage. In this 
framework, the PPP has been involved as an interpretative tool in various ECJ cases aiming at enlightening 
vague provisions of different EU Directives as well as clarifying its ambiguous aspects concerning two main 
issues: i. the identification of the polluter via the research of an adequate causal link and ii. the determination of 
the cost that the polluter should pay.  
With regard to the identification of the polluter the condition that should be certainly fulfilled is the 
establishment of a causal link between the damage and the behavior or the activity of the polluter. Particularly, 
according to the PPP only the person who has contributed to the pollution1 that lead in the final environmental 
harm2 can be charged with the burden of remedying it. However, given that it is not always easy to determine 
who has certainly contributed to the pollution, the ECJ applying the PPP to waste liability cases relating to the 
clean-up of sites polluted by hydrocarbons3 held that the liability can be channeled along the production chain of 
the waste provided that the conduct of these parts has given rise to the pollution4. Moreover, following this 
extended approach concerning the imputation of the cost for the pollution the ECJ ruled that in situations of 
scientific uncertainty regarding the causal contribution of the polluter to the final harmful effect, it is consistent 
with PPP to attribute the liability via taxes based on plausible evidence5.  
Namely, the ECJ held that there is no breach of the PPP when the waste management charges are 
calculated on the basis of the economic activity or the surface area of the undertaking, instead of the amount of 
waste produced and collected, when this is based on objective criteria and it is impossible to verify the exact 
contribution of the polluter 6 . As a result, national authorities are endowed with "broad discretion" when 
determining the manner in which an environmental charge must be calculated adopting a position that enriches 
the PPP with a precautionary aspect7. Although the PPP does not preclude, per se, the adoption of such taxes or 
does not impose on Member States any specific method of financing the cost of pollution, it has been stressed by 
the ECJ that it must be ensured that through the imposition of these measures the levy is actually reimbursed by 
the holders of the waste8 and that the abovementioned method should be unconditional and sufficiently precise to 
have direct effects9. 
With respect to the determination of the environmental costs that should be imputed to the responsible 
polluter, the PPP encapsulates a double dimension. According to the ex ante approach the polluter is obliged to 
assume the costs for the prevention and control of the pollution (basically via regulation or taxes), whilst by the 
ex post approach the polluter is charged also with cost for the reparation and the compensation of the incurred 
damages10. In this framework, the ECJ in the van de Walle and Commune de Mesquer cases referred to "the cost 
of elimination of the waste11", whereas a more extended version of the costs is reflected in the Pontina Ambiente 
case, where in that levy is also included "financial penalties imposed on the operator of a landfill site for late 
payment of such a levy12". In any case, these charges should be in proportion to the damage the polluters have 
caused13. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
livre vert de la Commission des Communautés européennes, (Recuel Dalloz Sirey, 1994),  p. 101-102. 
1For example, C-254/08 Futura Immobiliare srl Hotel Futura v. Comune di Casoria [2009] 3 CMLR 45, par 45; C-378/08 
Raffinerie Mediteranee (ERG) v. Ministero dello Sviluppo [2010] 3 CMLR, paras 57 and 67. 
2C-1/03 Paul Van de Walle [2004] ECR I-7613, para. 60. 
3C-1/03 and C-188/07 Mesquer [2009] ECR I-4501.   
4Pursuant to the PPP the ECJ ruled that in the Commune de Mesquer case apart from the shipowner (principal responsible) 
the producer of heavy fuel oil as well as the seller and the oil tanker charterer could be held liable, on the ground that they 
could be deemed to have contributed in some way to the causal chain which led to the shipwreck (paras74-78). Respectively, 
in the van de Walle case it was concluded that an oil company selling hydrocarbons to the manager of a petrol station can, 
under certain circumstances, be considered to be the holder of the land contaminated by hydrocarbons that accidentally leak 
from the station's storage tanks (paras. 59-60).    
5C-254/08, para. 52. 
6C-254/08, paras. 53-57. 
7J. Monien, Prinzipien als Wegbereiter eines globalen Umweltrechts? Das Nachhaltigkeits-, Vorsorge- und Verursacherprinzip 
im Mehrenebensystem, (Nomos, 2014), p. 374. 
8C-172/08 Pontina Ambiente [2010] ECR I-1175, para. 38. 
9C-97/11 Amia SpA [2012] OJ C200/2, paras 35 and 37. 
10 J. Monien, Prinzipien als Wegbereiter eines globalen Umweltrechts? Das Nachhaltigkeits-, Vorsorge- und 
Verursacherprinzip im Mehrenebensystem Op.Cit., p. 353; A. Bleeker, Does the polluter pay? The Polluter-Pays-Principle in 
the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, (European Energy and Environmental Law Review, vol. 18, 2009), p. 291-
292. 
11Case C-1/03 paras. 42-53 , Case C-188/07  paras. 49-63. 
12Case C-172/08 paras. 39-40. 
13Case C-293/97 Standley [1999] ECR I-2603,paras. 51-52, Case C-254/08 paras. 64-67. 
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3. The framework of the EU State Aids Law 
3.1. The general prohibitions of State aid (Art. 107(1) TFEU) 
The legal framework that governs the legality and compatibility of the State aids consists of articles 107-109 
TFEU and a large number of secondary measures and guidelines. According to the highly contested definition 
given on the Art. 107(1) TFEU, an economic measure can be identified as State aid, if it fulfills a number of 
conditions set by the EU legislator aiming at the establishment and maintenance of a system of free and 
undistorted competition. In particular, an economic intervention can be defined as state aid and, therefore, as 
prohibited, if it is about an intervention i. by the member state or through state resources, ii. that gives the 
recipient an economic advantage, iii. has a selective character and  iv. affects trade and restriction of the 
competition.  
The first criterion is considered to be very broad, since the demanded involvement of the state resources 
can be very widely established. In particular, this can include regional as well as central government1, whereas it 
is not suffice that the measure constituting aid was taken by a public undertaking. It has to be shown that the 
state actually exercised control over the undertaking and was involved in the adoption of the measure 2 . 
Additionally, in cases where the funds are in the hands of a company where the state is a shareholder, it should 
be investigated whether the State is responsible for an investment made by the company on the basis of the 
degree of control the state has in the company’s activities3.   
Pertaining to the advantage conferred on the recipient the Commission has provided an illustrative list 
of types of aid such as direct subsidies, tax exemptions, exemption from parafiscal charges, preferential interest 
rates, favorable loan guarantees, indemnities against losses and preferential terms for public ordering4. Based on 
this enumeration it is to be figured out that the concept of aid does not cover only positive benefits, but it 
includes also intervention that mitigate the charges an undertaking would normally bear5.  
Furthermore, the ECJ in order to determine whether the Member State’s intervention confers an 
advantage examines if under “normal market conditions” that undertaking would have secured a comparable 
advantage6. According to this technique, which is known as “private sector test”, it is to be identified if the 
measures taken by the State constitute an economically rational investment that would have been taken by a 
private investor 7 .  However, there are practical difficulties in applying this test, and in many cases, the 
Commission has been criticized for failing take into account all the evidence8.  
With respect to the selectivity of the contentious economic measure it should be underlined that in the 
light of the case law regarding this condition, general measures of economic policy, such as an interest-rate 
reduction, while benefiting industrial sales, will not in themselves classified as aid9. In this framework, it can be 
mentioned as example, firstly, the geographical selectivity10 and, secondly, the material selectivity11. According 
to a significant approach developed in the wake of ECJ judgements although a measure can be initially assessed 
as selective, this selectivity can be finally acceptable if it is justified by the general scheme of the economic 
measure12.  
Finally, the last requirement concerning the effect on trade and the restriction of competition seems to 
be unproblematic. The relatively small amount of the aid, or the relatively small size of the recipient undertaking, 
does not exclude the possibility that EU trade might be affected 13. In any case it is not necessary for the 
Commission to prove that trade will be affected; it is sufficient to show that trade might be affected14.  
At a procedural level, within the framework set out in the TFEU and Council Regulations made under 
                                                          
1C-323/82 Intermills, [1984] ECR 03809, par. 98, T-227,229, 265, 266 and 270/01 Territoria Histórico de Ávala and others v. 
Commission, 9 September 2009.  
2T-442/03 SIC-Sociedade Independente de Cominicação , SA v. Commission [2008] ECR II-1161. 
3 C-482/99 France v. Commission [2002] ECR I-4397 
4P. Graig, G. de Búrga, EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials, (5th Edition, Oxford, 2015), p. 1088.   
5C-222/04 Minstero dell’Economia e della Finanze v. Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA  [2006] ECR I-289, par. 131; C-
393/04 and 41/05 Air Liquide SA v. Province de Liège [2006] ECR I-5293 ECR I-5293.  
6C-342/96 Spain v. Commission [1999] ECR I-02459, para. 412.  
7For example, loans and terms of the loans.  
8C-483/99 Commission v. France [2002] ECR Ι-04781 and Case T-98/00 Linde v Commission [2002] ECR II-03961.  
9C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH [2001] ECR I-8365, par. 35.   
10Cases that refers to decision of local governments to take specific measures designed to benefit the business of this region 
only, C- 88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-7115.  
11This covers measures that apply to the whole territory of a Member State, but only to certain types of undertakings. 
Indicatively, the condition of selectivity I fulfilled in cases of measures that benefit only small or only large undertakings, as 
well as measures benefiting only certain manufacturers. Cases C-409/00 Spain v. Commission [2003] ECR I-01487 and C-
222/04 Casa di Risparmio di Firenze and others [2006] ECR I-00289.   
12C-173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] ECR 709, para. 33.  
13C-142/87 Re Tubemeuse: Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, par. 43.  
14 T-211/05 Italy v Commission, 4 Sept. 2009, para. 151-155.   
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Art. 108 TFEU, the European Commission has a key role in reviewing existing aid and in deciding on plans to 
grant or alter aid. In exceptional circumstances, the Council may decide that aid is compatible with the Internal 
Market and thereby block the Commission action. Namely, once a measure is found to be a State aid, then the 
Member State must notify it to the Commission and wait for approval. Subsequently, the Commission may 
determine that the aid cannot be given or may only be granted if modified, and the Member State must report to 
the Commission on the implementation of the aid anew. In general, the Commission as well as the courts play, a 
very crucial role concerning the delimitation of the state aid.   
 
3.2. The provision of derogations to the general prohibition (Art. 107(2) & (3) TFEU) 
Not all State aid is incompatible with the internal market, defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties”. However, it is recognized that State aid may in certain circumstances be necessary for a well-
functioning and fairly-run economy. Hence, there are a number of recognized exemptions. Three categories of 
aid are deemed to be compatible with the Internal Market in line with the Art. 107(2) TFEU. Namely, a. aid 
having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that it is granted without discrimination 
related to the origin of the products concerned, b. aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional circumstances and c. aid granted to certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the 
former division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic 
disadvantages caused by that division.    
Other categories of aid may be considered to be compatible with the Internal Market according to the 
Art. 107(3) TFEU: a. aid to promote the economic development of areas where there is an abnormally low 
standard of living or serious unemployment and of regions referred to in Art. 349 TFEU, in view of their 
structural, economic and social situation, b. aid to promote the execution of an important project of common 
European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, c. aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely 
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, d. aid to promote culture and heritage 
conservation where it does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Union to an extent that this is 
contrary to the common interest and e. such other categories of aid as may be specifies by decision of the 
Council on a proposal from the Commission.    
 
4. The role of the PPP in the State Aids Law for environmental protection 
4.1 Conflict between the PPP and the State Aids Law (?) 
According to the main obligation deriving from the PPP, the polluters shall pay for the pollution prevention and 
control measures and for environmental damages they cause (internalization of environmental damages) without 
any subsidization from government or society1. However, given the high cost of these environmental measures a 
rational company has absolutely no incentive to take these externalities into account when deciding upon its 
level and techniques of production. In this framework, the counterweight to the abovementioned failure of the 
market is the need for public intervention. Consequently, in contrast to the initial approach of the PPP only as a 
mere prohibition of aid to polluters2, the fruitful role of the PPP in the scope of State aid control was aptly 
defined by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion in the case GEMO:  
“In its State aid practice the Commission uses the polluter pays principle for two distinct purposes, namely (a) to 
determine whether a measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of the Article 87(1) EC and (b) to decide 
whether a given aid may be declared compatible with the Treaty under Art. 87(3) EC. In its first context, that of 
the Art. 87(1) EC, the principle is used as an analytical tool to allocate responsibility according to economic 
criteria for the cost entailed by the pollution in question. A given measure will constitute State aid where it 
relieves those liable under the polluter pays principle from their primarily responsibility to bear the costs.  In its 
second context, that of the Art. 87(3) EC, the PPP is used by contrast in a prescriptive way as a policy criterion. 
It is relied on to argue that the costs of environmental protection should as a matter of sound environmental and 
State aid policy ultimately be borne by the polluters themselves rather than the State”3.  
It is clear that the contribution of the PPP to the EU State law is very important. This is emphatically 
confirmed by the Guidelines of the European Commission regarding State aid for environmental protection. The 
Commission -being responsible for the control and monitoring of the State aids across EU- issued several acts 
with no binding nature on State aids for environmental protection in order to ensure legal certainty, unify 
                                                          
1J. R. Nash, Too much market? Conflict between tradable pollution allowances and “the polluter pays” principle, (2 Harvard 
Environmental Law Review, 2000,) p. 3.  
2E. de Sabran Pontevès, Les transcriptions juridiques du principe pollueur-payeur, (Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 
Aix-en-Provence, 2007), p. 65.  
3Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-126/01 Ministre de l’economie, des finances et de l’industrie v. GEMO, [2003],ECR I-
13769, par. 68-70.  
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practices and limit the scope of its own discretion1. In 1994, the Commission adopted the first Community 
Guidelines on State aid for Environmental Protection2, followed by the Guidelines of 20013, and then the 
Guidelines of 20084. At present, the Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 
are in effect5.  
All these texts refer explicitly to the PPP by underlying that the target situation is the situation where 
the PPP would be fully implemented and the entire environmental costs would be internalized6. In this sense, 
State aids and the PPP seem to have a contradictory relation. Nevertheless, the Commission stated that the 
primary objective of State aid control in the field of environmental protection is to ensure that the aid awarded 
improves the level of environmental protection, which would not be possible without this aid, and to ensure that 
the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects in terms of distortions of competition, taking into 
account the PPP.  
Therefore, in the current state of law, it appears that certain categories of aid can be considered 
compatible with the internal market in the light of the provision of the Art. 107(3)(c) as well as of the 
aforementioned Guidelines7. First of all, it is about “aid for undertakings which go beyond [EU] standards or 
which increase the level of environmental protection in the absence of [EU] standards”8. This provision seem to 
be reasonable given how financially demanding it is, an undertaking willing to reach such levels of 
environmental protection would inevitably suffer a strong competitive disadvantage which could precisely make 
State aid quite useful provided that is limited to the amount necessary to attain the relevant goals9. Moreover, 
aids aiming at the rectification of market failures by incentiving undertakings to reach precise objectives in terms 
of energy savings a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions are compatible with the internal market on the 
condition that the incurred expenditures are not compulsory or profitable to the undertakings10.  
 
4.2. The recognition of certain acceptable environmental state aids 
As already mentioned above there are a number of state aids that can be considered either consistent with the 
PPP or justified exemptions from it. Indicatively, aids that comply directly with the PPP aim at resolving a 
market failure (resulting from the absence of internalization of environmental costs in certain production types) 
by supporting the production of more environmentally sound but more expensive substitutes11. For example, aid 
for renewable energy sources12 or aid for environmentally friendly biofuels13, since under the existing traditional 
energy generation sector the PPP cannot be fully implemented14.  
Moreover, regarding the aids for achieving higher level of environmental protection in this category fall 
into aids for meeting more stringent environmental standards or improving level of environmental protection in 
the case where EU standards are absent15, aids for the acquisition of transport vehicles which go beyond 
community standards16 as well as aids for early adaptation to future community standards17. Furthermore, in the 
scope of the acceptable aids for not being in contrast to the PPP fall into the following cases: aid for the 
relocation of undertakings, aid involved in tradable permit schemes and the aid in the form of reductions or 
exemptions from environmental taxes18.    
In particular, as far as the first case is concerned the granted aid intended to encourage undertakings to 
prevent negative externalities by relocating plants which generate substantial pollution levels to the areas where 
                                                          
1U. Soltész, F. Schatz, State Aid for Environmental Protection. The Commission’s new Guidelines and the new General Block 
Exemption Regulation, (JEEPL, 6.2., 2009), p. 150-151.  
2OJ C 72, 10.03.1994. 
3OJ C 37, 3.02.2001. 
4OJ C 82/1, 01.04.2008.  
5OJ C 200/01, 28.06.2014.  
6H. Vedder, Competition Law and Environmental Protection in Europe; Towards Sustainability?, (Europa Law Publishing, 
Groningen, 2003), p. 301.  
7C. London, Concurrence et environnement: une entente écologiquement raationelle?, (2 RTDE, 2003) p. 279.  
8 2008 Guidelines, point 1.5.1.  
9M. Stoczkiewicz, The polluter pays principle and State aid for environmental protection, Op.Cit., p. 196.  
10Guidelines 2008, para. 47.  
11Μ. Stoczkiewicz, The polluter pays principle and State aid for environmental protection, Op.Cit., p. 185. 
12Commission Decision State aid N 458/2006-Germany. Modification of the aid scheme “Aid for the use of renewable 
energies”, C(2006)4234.  
13Commission Decision State aid N 418/2006-United Kingdom. Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO), C(2007)8.  
14See also, Commission Decision State aid N 271/2006-Denmark. Tax relief for Supply of Surplus Heating, C(2006)6591, 
points 2.1 and 4.  
152008 Guidelines, section 3.1.1 (73)-(84). 
162008 Guidelines, section 3.1.1 (85)-(86). 
172008 Guidelines, section 3.1.1 (87)-(90). 
18Μ. Stoczkiewicz, The polluter pays principle and State aid for environmental protection, Op.Cit., p. 190. 
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such pollution would have less harmful impacts on the environment, thus reducing external costs1. An indicative 
example of aids in the framework of tradable permit schemes is given by the case Netherlands v. Commission, 
which pertains to a system which allocated gratuitously rights to 250 large polluting facilities, whilst smaller 
ones were imposed emission ceilings and were excluded from this scheme. Although in the opinion of the Court 
of First Instance this measure was not considered to be a State aid, on the grounds that undertakings were 
distinguished according to ecological considerations and that the beneficiaries were ipso facto selected in 
accordance with the nature and general scheme of the system 2 , the ECJ held to the contrary. Namely, it 
elucidated that a differentiation based upon purely quantitative criterion –in casu the total installed thermal 
capacity- cannot be regarded as inherent to a scheme aiming at reducing industrial pollution3. 
Finally, reductions or exemptions from environmental taxes on certain activities, which may allow for 
the adoption of higher taxes increasing the general level of the internalization of external costs should be in 
consistency with PPP, which constitute a general principle underlying a fiscal regime intended to generate 
incentives to adopt an environmental friendly behavior or to inflict on the polluter a burden corresponding to its 
share in environmental degradation4. Accordingly, in the case British Aggregates in particular, the ECJ held that 
Member States are not free to set priorities in the field of environmental protection and to determine which goals 
and-or services shall be subjected to an environmental levy with the result that the latter does not apply to all 
activities which have a similar impact on the environment5.     
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper tried to shed light to the role of the PPP in the EU State Aid law. Despite the apparent contradiction 
of these two concepts it has been proved that the area of environmental protection constitutes a field of 
compromise and fruitful coexistence. The crucial decision of the Commission as well as of the General Court 
and the ECJ to interpret broadly the PPP contributed to its integration as analytical tool and policy element into 
the framework of Art. 107 TFEU. This conciliation between the imperatives of the PPP and the competition law 
seems to ensure with the most efficient way the environmental protection.  
Based on the aforementioned nuanced approach of the PPP it is undeniable that some categories of aids 
being granted to polluting industries are not incompatible with its content. In this context, the PPP acquires a 
double function: on the one hand, it imposes that the polluter is financially liable for meeting the requirements 
applicable under the existing environmental legislation. This is carried out via the prohibition of the 
subsidization of undertakings for environmental purposes. On the other hand, the PPP also has a significant 
effect on the practice of the European Commission regarding the control of the State aids by functioning as a 
crucial criterion at the qualification phase of a State aid6. Hence, the function of the PPP in the framework of 
State Aids Law delineates its role as a link between EU economic law and EU environmental law. The interplay 
of these EU legal areas in the light of the aggravation of environmental problems seems to be the appropriate 
way to fulfill the need for more efficient environmental policy measures.          
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